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HAIR AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
twenty-five to thirty-five per cent of the indigent cases, teach a course for
credit to local law students, and give assistance to the private counsel who
defend the remaining indigent cases.60
Deficiencies in the public defender system such as the alleged lack of
adverseness or nonparticipation by the local bar could be remedied by a
system which provides centralized control but at the same time utilizes in-
dependent assigned counsel. Likewise, deficiencies in the assigned counsel
system such as higher cost and inefficient operations could be remedied by
allowing the public defender to handle the time and money-consuming
appeals, leaving the defense of indigents at trial to assigned attorneys.
It may be that still further legislative action is needed to create an ideal
public defender system for North Carolina. The General Assembly could
balance the issues presented and design a system which simultaneously
avoids the deficiencies and includes the advantages of both systems now
being tested. A hybrid system similar yet not necessarily identical to
those discussed could yield the best possible result. This is the kind of
system that is needed in order to meet the demand for assigned counsel
by the most efficient and effective method.
RIcHAiRD L. GRIER
Hair and the Bight to Public Education
INTRODUCTION
In a nation beset by a generation gap, one of the major areas of di-
vision between young and old is personal appearance. Nowhere is this
conflict more evident than in the recent burst of litigation involving
students, usually males with long hair, suspended from public schools for
violating high school grooming codes.1 Prior to 1969 there had been only
two "hair" cases in the federal courts; since that time there have been at
least thirty-eight reported cases. The establishment, as represented by
school authorities, assert the right to regulate length of hair as a means of
promoting order, discipline, an academic atmosphere, and good citizen-
" Warner, The Public Defender and Other Suggested Systems for the Defense
of Indigents, 53 JuDicATuRE 245, 245-46 (1969-70).
1 The school grooming code most often promulgated requires that hair be
"combed and worn so it does not hang below the collar line in the back, over the
ears on the side and must be above the eyebrows." Sideburns below the earlobe and
mustaches are also generally prohibited. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1035 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
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ship. Students, on the other hand, have insisted that the length of one's
hair is a matter of individual discretion and personal freedom, and at
times they have claimed it was protected by the Constitution and thereby
was exempted from school regulation.
As of this writing2 the circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on the
question stand in disagreement as to the two views, and the Supreme
Court has not granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.8 Perhaps the
feeling of the Court was expressed by Justice Black, when he denied a
motion by Chesley Karr, a student at Coronado High School in El Paso,
Texas, to suspend the school's rule against long hair while his suit moved
through the federal courts:
All the federal courts, including the Supreme Court are heavily bur-
dened with important cases, the kind they must be able to handle if
they are to perform their responsibility to society. Moreover, our Con-
stitution has sought to distribute the powers of government in this
nation between the United States and the states. Surely, the federal
judiciary can perform no greater service to the nation than to leave
the states unhampered in the performance of purely local affairs. Sure-
ly few policies can be thought of in which states are more capable of
deciding than the length of the hair of schoolboys.
4
2 March 1, 1971.' Certiorari has been denied in three cases upholding the school board: Stevenson
v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970); Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). Certiorari has also been denied in one case in which
the court held for the student. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970),
in which the court also held for the student, has not been appealed.
'Karr v. Schmidt, 91 S. Ct. 592, 593 (1971) (Black, J., sitting as a Circuit
Justice). Some lower federal courts apparently agree that the issue is not important
enough for judicial consideration. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of
Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970), in which
Judge Lawrence said:
All this [desegregation effort] is suddenly jeopardized by a lilliput of
a lawsuit-a legal controversy which has upset everybody in the school
system-a cause celebre that attracted a courtroom full of spectators....
What does it involve? It concerns the monumental question of the constitu-
tional right of a student to wear a mustache in violation of a regulation of
the school authorities.
Id. at 1155. In Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968), Mr.
justice Douglas, dissenting to the denial of certiorari, expressed a different
opinion:
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states are restrained
by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can be denied education in public
school because of the length of his hair. I suppose that a nation bent on
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Nevertheless, an increasing number of plaintiffs seek relief from hair
regulation through the federal courts."
Student rights against encroachments of their constitutional guarantees
by school authorities were throughly reviewed by the Supreme Court
in the key case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,' in which the Court said:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitar-
ianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obli-
gations to the State.7
Most courts confronted with a student-constitutional rights issue will
follow Tinker in holding that a student is entitled to protection under
the Constitution.8 However, in spite of the commandment from the
Supreme Court, two federal district courts have expressed the opinion
that student rights are more limited than would appear from Tinker. An
Arkansas federal court in Corley v. Daunhauer? compared student rights
turning out robots might insist that every male have a crew cut and every
female wear pigtails. But the ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later found specific
definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom of expression
and a wide zone of privacy. I had supposed these guarantees permitted
idiosyncrasies to flourish, especially when they concern the image of one's
personality and his philosophy toward government and his fellow men.
'Most plaintiffs proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and the first
and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. Most federal courts have held that
the plaintiff need not exhaust his state remedies first. See, e.g., Alexander v. Thomp-
son, 313 F. Supp. 1389, 1397-98 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F.
Supp. 248, 250 (D. Neb. 1970) ; Pritchard v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist., 308
F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Tex. 1970). At least one district court has held that the
remedies available to these students were to be pursued in state, not federal courts.
Schwartz v. Galveston Indep. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
'393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7 Id. at 511.
'See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970); Lansdale v. Tyler junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529, 531-32 (E.D. Tex.
1970) ; Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 417 (D. Vt. 1970) ; Sims v. Colfax
Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D. Iowa 1970). The court in
Dunham added that
it should be observed that the Constitution does not stop at the public school
doors like a puppy waiting for its master, but instead it follows the student
through the corridors, into the classroom, and onto the athletic field.
312 F. Supp. at 417. See also Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Minn.
1969).
° 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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to those of inmates in penal institutions," while Judge Clarie of the
District Court of Connecticut felt that to equate the rights of adults and
high school students in the area of personal appearance was like com-
paring oranges and apples.1
Another viewpoint is that discretion should be granted to those charged
with the responsibility of educating children to make rules and regulations
to insure the efficient operation of the school.' Thus courts have recog-
nized that there are "differences between what are reasonable restraints
in the classroom and what are reasonable restraints on the street corner."' 8
Some federal courts will hesitate to involve themselves in student-school
controversies, using as a justification a statement such as that in Epperson
v. Arkansas:'4
By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the con-
trol of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in
the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic consti-
tutional values.15
Undoubtedly another reason for judicial hesitance to intervene might be
the feeling that schools are managed by professional educators more
familar with particular needs and problems than the courts could be.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
The validity of public school regulation of students' hair styles has
been challenged on the following four constitutional grounds: 1) as a
10 Id. at 816.
11 Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 118-19 (D. Conn. 1970).
12 The notion is one of long standing. See 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMM.ENTARIES
297:
He [the parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority... to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such portion of the power committed to his charge, viz: that of restraint and
coercion as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is em-
ployed.
The doctrine still has vitality, as pointed out by judge Godbold in Ferrell v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968)
(concurring opinion) : "Whether it should or should not do so the American com-
munity calls upon its school to, in substance, stand in loco parentis to its children
for many hours of each school week."
"8 Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 704-05 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
1*393 U.S. 97 (1968).
" Id. at 104. See also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1045, 1051-55 (1968).
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violation of substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment, 2)
as an infringement on freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amend-
ment, 3) as a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment,
and 4) as an abridgment of a fundamental freedom under the ninth
amendment. The validity of each of these grounds involves a balancing
of the interests of the state as against those of the students.
The most successful argument is that of substantive due process, i.e.,
a taking of an individual's liberty to choose his personal appearance with-
out due process of law. The key choice that a court must make on this
issue is whether an individual's choice of hair style is a ftmdamental
interest which may be abridged only by compelling state interests or
should be viewed more as an economic interest, subject to restriction if
there is "any rational basis" for it.'" Most courts that rule against the due
process argument generally follow the latter approach, saying the regula-
tion bears a rational relationship to effective operation of schools.' 7 Some
have followed the former rationale, terming the state interest in maintain-
ing an efficient school system compelling.' The few courts that have
found the freedom to wear one's hair to be fundamental are adamant in
the belief that a compelling state interest is required in order to abridge
this right:
For the state to impair this freedom, in the absence of a compelling
subordinating interest in doing so, would offend a widely shared con-
cept of human dignity, would assault personality and individuality...
identity, and would invade the human "being." ... It would deprive a
man or a woman of liberty without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Other courts hold that the due process clause creates a "sphere of
personal liberty" into which the government may not intrude without a
"6 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ;
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
"'E.g., Wood v. Alamo HEights Indep. School Dist., 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir.
1970); Southern v. Board of Trustees, 318 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970);
Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Gfell v. Rickelman, 313
F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
" Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 856 (1968).
" Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 706 (W.D. Wise.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Accord, Dunham v. Pulsifer,
312 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Vt. 1970) ; Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307
F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
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showing of substantial justification or the self-evidence of the justifica-
tion.20
The equal protection argument has been successful in only a few cases
to date. The most important is the recent case of Crews v. Cloncs,2' in
which the court held that exclusion of long-haired male students from
classes constituted a denial of equal protection,' where females were in-
gaged in substantially the same activities. Dunham v. Pulsiferm involved
an athletic grooming code that was found to violate equal protection-
school officials, having extended the right to participate in athletics to all
students, denied it on the basis of a classification that had no reasonable
relation to 'the conduct of the athletic program.24
The first amendment argument centers around the idea that a student
may wear his hair long as a protest or manifestation of some cultural
philosophy , therefore, his right to wear his hair at any length is "symbolic
speech" as was the wearing of armbands in Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District.2" No court has accepted a pure
first amendment argument in hair cases. In fact, most courts reject the
argument entirely, saying either that there was no evidence the plaintiff
wore his hair as a symbol"r or that a symbol must be specific or identifiable
to merit protection under Tinker." One court expressed the view that in
20 Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970); Westley v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Minn. 1969). Both courts pointed out that regulation of
length of hair is permanent in nature, affecting a student twenty-four hours a day, as
opposed to only during school hours. In Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 963
(N.D. Ohio 1970), the court held that the hair code was violative of due process in
that the principal exceeded his authority, and in Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201, 203
(5th Cir. 1970), the court held that the code was arbitrary and unreasonable as
applied.
"1432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
2 Id. at 1266. For the court's handling of the disruption issue see page 726 infra.
In accord is the unreported case of Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. I11.
1969), cited in 4 VAiARAiso U.L. Rsv. 400, 411-12 (1970). See also Westley v.
Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Minn. 1969); Zachary v. Brown, 299 F. Supp.
1360, 1362 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
" 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
2 'Id. at 420.
25 The plaintiff in Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 455 (D. Mass. 1969),
explained that his hair was a symbol of "his association with some of the younger
generation in expressing their independent aesthetic and social outlook and their
determination to reject many of the customs and values of some of the older gen-
eration."
2- 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
"'Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 8 (N.D. Il. 1970); Brownlee v.
Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-65 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
28 Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970) ; Davis v. Firment,
269 F. Supp. 524, 527 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (1969).
[Vol. 49
9 HAIR AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
order to qualify for first amendment protection, an expression or point of
view must "make a significant contribution to the 'marketplace of ideas.' "I
A first amendment argument has been successful in two cases, Breen v.
KahI30 and Dunham v. Pulsifer' In both cases, the court combined the
first and the ninth amendments to find a "penumbra" in which the right
to govern one's appearance is fundamental. 2 Each court seemed to be
hesitant to confront the first amendment directly. Although these courts
-had difficulty locating the right precisely, the appellate court in Breen was
convinced that it was fundamental in nature.3 This view is also expressed
in Richards v. Thurston,4 in which the right to wear one's hair as he
pleases is described as "one of the aspects of personal liberty, that is,
liberty of appearance ... or, alternatively, as one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. 81 5 In one case, Crossen v. Fatsi,30 the court held that a
school grooming code was unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable in
that it violated the pupils' right to privacy under the Griswold doctrine,
37
but left the door open for the school board to adopt a more precise groom-
ing code."8
THE SCHOOL BOARD'S ARGUMENTS
Although school boards have occasionally been successful in claiming
that there is no constitutional protection for the right to wear long hair,
39
the majority of cases holding for the defendant school board have recog-
nized the right as protected under the constitution and then have proceeded
to find an overriding state interest or justification. The most used and
most often successful argument is disruption to the educational process;
that is, the state's overriding interest in maintaining an efficient and
20 Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Colo. 1969).
0 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wisc.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
01312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9, Breen v. Kall, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970).
"' 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), afd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
00Id. at 455.
00309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
0 Id. at 118. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
00309 F. Supp. at 118. The unconstitutionally vague code read:
Students are to be neatly dressed and groomed maintaining standards of
modesty and good taste conducive to an educational atmosphere. It is ex-
pected that clothing and grooming not be of an extreme style and fashion.
Id. at 115-16.
"' See, e.g., Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1085
(5th Cir. 1969).
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effective learning atmosphere is thwarted by plaintiff's long hair. It is
disruptive in that other students become either so incensed or so excited
over a long-haired male that control of the class becomes difficult or im-
possible thereby eliminating a learning situation. How realistic this
claim is becomes an evidentiary consideration for the court. Although most
accept the disruption argument, some judges have indicated their belief
that the true motive for excluding the long-haired student was a "per-
sonal distaste [on the part of school board authorities] for persons ...
who do not conform to societal norm."4
The "disruption" theory was born in Tinker itself, in which the court
suggested that school regulations, although violating constitutional rights,
might be upheld if "justified by a showing that the students' activities
would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of
the school."41 The crucial determination, of course, is what constitutes a
"material and substantial" disruption. A district court in Nebraska has
held that the fact that one-half of the students who cause discipline prob-
lems have long hair did not warrant a finding of a substantial disrup-
tion.4 Most courts that hold for the defendants on the disruption issue
have not been harsh in requiring the defendant to prove a substantial and
material disruption. Some find that the burden has been met where the
principal testifies that in his opinion disruptions would result,43 and one
court held that where there was a mere "diverting influence on the stu-
dent body," the regulation may be upheld.44 Fears of harassment and
•o Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Richards v.
Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 456 (D. Mass. 1969), aft'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir.
1970). The reason given by the defendants in one early case for suspending certain
students was a personal dislike of long hair on males. Zachry v. Brown, 299 F.
Supp. 1360, 1362 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (decided in favor of the plaintiff students).
"393 U.S. 503, 513 (1968). There are at least tvo cases on record that have
denied students the right to wear "freedom" or "anti-war" buttons because of their
disruptive effect. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970); Blackwell v.
Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
" Black v. Cothern, 316 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Neb. 1970). Other courts have
maintained that the burden of establishing a valid reason for expulsion is a heavy
one. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 702, 708-09 (W.D. Wisc.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
" Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 700-01 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776,
778 (W.D. Mo. 1969) ; Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D. Colo.
1969). But see Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529, 534 (E.D. Tex.
1970) (unrealized fears of hypothetical disruptions may not be used as a basis for
denying the constitutional right to wear one's hair long).
" Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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threats against long-haired males by fellow students may also provide
justification for the regulation.
45
Judge Wyzanski in Richards v. Thurstoi45 took the position that the
fact that plaintiff's long hair caused others to be disorderly is not a valid
ground for denying the plaintiff his right to wear his hair as he wished.47
A more recent federal case has suggested a new approach to the disruption
problem. The court in Crews v. Cloncs48 pointed out that
[t]he record is silent, however, concerning actions taken by school
officials to punish those students who actually caused the relatively in-
substantial disruption which occurred in this case. Therefore, we hold
that defendants have failed to satisfy their substantial burden of justi-
fication under their [disruption] theory.49
It appears that the court would require school authorities to show that
they had attempted to discipline those causing the disruptions before grant-
ing enforcement of a hair cut regulation ostensibly aimed at preventing
disruptions. A classroom disturbance or distraction that can be controlled
through normal disciplinary procedures should not be allowed to pass for
a "material and substantial" disruption.
Courts have listened to numerous other justifications for hair regula-
tions: health and safety," maintaining and/or teaching discipline,5 pro-
moting good citizenship, 2 the correlation between long hair and poor
marks,5 aesthetic considerations, 4 and others.' None, however, have
" Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 779 (W.D. Mo. 1969) ;
Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D. Colo. 1969); Westley v.
Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 709 (D. Minn. 1969).
304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
,Id. Accord, Laine v. Dittman, 125 Ill. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d 824 (1970)
(where the disruption was among only a small percentage of the students [20 of
200], there was no justification for requiring the plaintiff to cut his hair).
, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
,Id. at 1265-66.
50Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Westley v.
Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (D. Minn. 1969).
" Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970) ; Southern v. Board of Trustees, 318 F. Supp. a55, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1970) ;
Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist, 308 F. Supp. 551, 552 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
" Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485, 488 (S.D. Iowa
1970).
" Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850; Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
"Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
"The school authorities in Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 61 (M.D. Ala.
1971]
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the force of the disruption argument.5 6
SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A number of unusual situations arise under high school grooming
codes. In the one case involving a female student, the plaintiff was suc-
cessful in challenging a hair regulation code after she had been suspended
because her hair was not "one finger width above the eyebrows [and] clear
across the forehead."57 Apparently she had "bangs." Mustache cases have
been less than successful for plaintiffs. In Stevenson v. Wheeler County
Board of Education,58 although one of the plaintiffs objected that he
had never shaved and was too young to begin,59 the court upheld a
"clear-shaven" policy and his suspension. In Lovelace v. Leechburg Area
School District,6" on the other hand, the court held that plaintiff's "labial
hirsute accresence" 1 was imperceptible and a natural growth and there-
fore was not violative of the grooming code. A California district court
abstained on the issue of length of sideburns. 2 Regarding length of hair
and participation in extracurricular affairs, the district courts are divided.
An athletic grooming code was struck down in Vermont 3 and upheld in
California.6" High school officials in the Eastern District of Arkansas
may require male students to cut their hair as a prerequisite to participation
in the band."
Almost all cases involving hair regulation on a college or junior
college level have been struck down.
6 6 One exception is Farrell v. Smith,
0 7
1969), attempted to justify the regulation on the grounds, among others, that the
.boys passed combs in class, were tardy because they lingered at the mirrors in the
restrooms, and that odor was caused by long hair.
" One other factor that seems to have an effect on courts is whether or not
students have taken an active role in formulating the grooming code. Cordova v.
Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 957 (N.D. Ohio 1970) ; Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp.
364, 366 (N.D. Ohio 1970) ; Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 308 F.
Supp. 551, 552 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Casey v. Henry, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.C.
1970).
" Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist, 307 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D. Iowa
1970).
" 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 957 (1970).
9 1d. at 99.
00 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
" Id. at 580 (roughly translated as "hairy lip").
Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
's Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
",Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
E.g., Landsdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F.- Supp. 529 (E.D. Tex. 1970);
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in which the court held that Southern Maine Vocational Technical In-
stitute had met its substantial burden of justification in demonstrating
that the haircut regulation enhanced the image of the school and furthered
the economic opportunities of its graduates.
CONCLUSION
The current"8 box score of all "hair" cases decided in the federal dis-
trict courts and circuit courts of appeals stands roughly twenty-four to
twelve in favor of upholding hair regulation by school officials, with four
cases holding for the students on technical grounds, but reserving to
school authorities the right to regulate hair.69 The circuit courts of
appeals are in disagreement, with the first7' and seventh 7l holding for the
student, and the fifth" and sixth" for school officials. The remaining
circuits do not have a circuit court of appeals decision; however, on the
basis of district court cases, it may be said that only the second circuit
leans in favor of the students, with two cases generally favoring freedom
of appearance, 4 while the rest have cases either solidly in favor of reg-
ulation of hair styles or divided.
It is difficult to forecast a trend in this area. Unless and until the
Supreme Court considers the hair issue worthy of consideration and speaks
on it, and as long as long hair remains fashionable for young men, there
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Zachry v. Brown, 299
F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970).
"See note 2 supra.
"The state court decisions are evenly split: Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal.
App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968) (held for the school board); Shows v.
Freeman, - Miss. -, 230 So. 2d 63 (1969) (held for the school board); Laine
Dittman, 125 Ill. App. 2d 136, 259 N.E.2d 824 (1970) (held for the student);
Leonard v. School Committee, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965) (held for the
student).
"o Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
' Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (first to hold that in order
for the defendants to be successful on the disruption theory, they must first prove in-
ability to control any disruption through normal disciplinary measures); Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
7 Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970);
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 957 (1970); Davis v. Firment, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 856 (1968).
J" ackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
"' Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970) ; Crossen v. Fatsi, 309
F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
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will be litigation. It would seem reasonable to assume that the more com-
monplace mustaches, beards, and long hair become among the young, the
more difficult it would be for school authorities to prove that hair hang-
ing over Johnny's ear (or collar) would "materially and substantially"
disrupt the classroom. This may not be the result, however. It is inter-
esting to note that the National Association of Secondary School Prin-
cipals, in a pamphlet by their chief counsel, does not take an unduly re-
strictive view on hair regulation:
The courts have clearly warned that freedom of speech or expression
is essential to the preservation of democracy and that this right can be
exercised in ways other than talking or writing. From this generaliza-
tion it follows that there should be no restriction on a student's hair
style or his nurnner of dressing unless these present a "clear and pres-
ent" danger to the students' h'ealth and safety, cause an interference
with work, or create classroom or school disorder.75
Perhaps the most rational approach to balancing the rights between
the personal freedoms of the student and the authority of the school
officials is to require a stricter standard of proof regarding material
and substantial disruption, as was done in CreZs v. Cloncs.70 The approach
would simply require school authorities to show that any dangers or
disruption could not be handled through normal school procedures." The
need for reconciliation of the rights of the individual with the desires of
the school authorities was well expressed by California Superior Court
Judge Watson in Myers v. Arcata Union High School District:
Certainly the school would be the first to concede that in a society as
advanced as that in which we live there is room for many personal
preferences and great care should be exercised insuring that what are
mere personal preferences of one are not forced upon another for mere
convenience since absolute uniformity among our citizens should be
our last desire 7s
J. MICHAEL BROWN
, R. ACKERTY, THE REASONABLE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY 9 (1969) (emphasis
by the author).
'432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970).
SIn Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1970), the court states the
test well: "The touchstone for sustaining such regulations is the demonstration that
they are necessary to alleviate interference with the educational process" (emphasis
added).
" Quoted in AMERICAN CiviL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC EEDOM IN THE
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 19 (1968).
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